Incentive Based Relaying in D2D Social Networks
Source of Publication
International Symposium on Advanced Networks and Telecommunication Systems, ANTS
© 2019 IEEE. Co-operative data transmission between Device-to-Device (D2D) user terminals is a challenging task due to the selfish behavior of the D2D Users (DUs). Incentivizing the DUs can promote communication which in turn even reduce the transmission burden on the base station (eNB). In this work, we consider a scenario, in which eNB pays incentive to DUs to relay the data among its best neighbors; while the communication is regulated by wireless channel, and social influence factors. In case, DUs refrain from relaying, the eNB ought to transmit directly which increase the cost of the eNB several folds. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, in which eNB plays the role of a leader to minimize its cost and DUs will be the followers who aim at maximizing their utility. We propose an iterative algorithm to establish the existence of equilibrium. We also prove the equilibrium of DUs subgame for a special case by relating it to a 0/1 knapsack problem. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithm has a better performance in terms of Utility and total base station cost than the conventional schemes.
Bhat, Jagadeesha R.; Anoop, C. V.; and Alfandi, Omar, "Incentive Based Relaying in D2D Social Networks" (2019). Scopus Indexed Articles. 476.