Corporate labor violations: Do CEOs’ public charity affiliations matter?

Document Type

Article

Source of Publication

Journal of Banking and Finance

Publication Date

3-1-2026

Abstract

We examine the impact of CEOs’ public charity affiliations on corporate labor violations and find that public-charity-affiliated CEOs have a lower likelihood of engaging in labor violations than their non-affiliated peers. In a disaggregated analysis, we find the result to be driven primarily by wage and hour violations. This finding is validated when we compare changes in wage and hour violations around different types of CEO turnover. We further identify the promotion of a positive corporate culture and an increase in labor-related expenditures as the main channels through which CEOs’ public charity affiliations affect wage and hour violations. In addition, we find that firms led by public-charity-affiliated CEOs experience lower employee turnover. The impact of public-charity-affiliated CEOs on reducing the likelihood of wage and hour violations is persistent and is more pronounced for CEOs who exhibit more altruistic behavior prior to assuming office. Overall, we provide persuasive evidence that CEOs’ public charity affiliations are beneficial to firms.

ISSN

0378-4266

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Volume

184

Disciplines

Business

Keywords

CEO altruism, CEOs’ public charity affiliations, Corporate culture, Corporate labor violations, Employee turnover, G30, J83, M14, M41, Wage and hour violations

Scopus ID

105027991426

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Indexed in Scopus

yes

Open Access

yes

Open Access Type

Hybrid: This publication is openly available in a subscription-based journal/series

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