Document Type

Article

Source of Publication

Corporate Ownership and Control

Publication Date

5-9-2022

Abstract

The board of directors serves two functions in the organization: monitoring and resource provision. Agency theory mainly addresses the former, while resource dependence theory focuses on the latter. However, these theories consistently assume that board members are not only able but also consistently willing to fulfill their roles. From a resource dependence perspective, this means that board members are generally inclined to share their resources (information, social and political connections, and functional experience) with the CEO. We challenge this assumption by postulating that in the context of dyadic conflict between the CEO and board chair, these resources will not be accessible to the CEO, hence the resource provision function of the board will be interrupted. We, therefore, unpack the black box of the board dynamics by merging resource dependence theory with conflict literature to a) present an in-depth description of the CEO-board chair conflict and b) its implications for the CEO (heightened turnover intentions), the board (board cohesion and board’s monitoring role), and the organization. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

ISSN

1727-9232

Publisher

Virtus Interpress

Volume

19

Issue

3

First Page

123

Last Page

123

Disciplines

Business

Keywords

Board Chair, Board Cohesion, Board of Directors, Board Functions, CEO, Conflict Handling, Resource Dependence Theory

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Indexed in Scopus

no

Open Access

yes

Open Access Type

Gold: This publication is openly available in an open access journal/series

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Business Commons

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